I’m usually a defender of the Reserve Bank of Australia, particularly when it comes to decisions about the cash rate.
But I cannot defend its decision to remove the ability of businesses to apply a surcharge to transactions made using credit or debit cards.
And the more I examine the downstream consequences, the more convinced I become that this is another example of a policy designed to deliver an attractive headline without sufficient consideration of what happens next.
It’s a classic game of economic Whack-A-Mole. Suppress a cost in one place & watch it pop up somewhere else.
The RBA knew electronic payment processing wasn’t free. It also knew that banks, card networks & payment processors couldn’t simply be expected to provide their services without recovering the costs involved. After all, it was the RBA that allowed surcharging in the first place, partly to improve transparency & encourage consumers to consider the cost of their chosen payment method.
So, it attempted a middle ground.
It reduced the domestic consumer credit card interchange fee cap from 0.8% to 0.3%, alongside reductions to debit card interchange fees.
But here’s the problem.
Interchange fees are only one component of the merchant service fees businesses pay to accept card transactions.
The total fee also includes card network charges, payment processing, fraud prevention, transaction authorisation, settlement infrastructure & the costs associated with maintaining the electronic payments system.
And the proportion attributable to interchange varies depending on the card, merchant & payment arrangement.
Those other costs haven’t magically disappeared because the RBA reduced interchange fees.
Nor has the RBA abolished merchant service fees.
It has simply removed the ability of businesses to separately recover those fees from customers choosing to pay by card.
And while reducing interchange fees may provide some relief to merchants, it doesn’t necessarily compensate them for losing the ability to recover their remaining costs through surcharges.
Which brings me to what I consider one of the more troubling consequences of this decision.
Who actually ends up paying?
Previously, where a business applied a surcharge, customers choosing to use a credit card could see an added charge, often somewhere between 1% & 2%, depending on the merchant and payment arrangement.
The customer could decide whether the convenience, credit facility or rewards associated with using that card justified the added cost.
Or they could choose another payment method.
Now businesses must either absorb their remaining merchant fees, negotiate lower rates or recover those costs elsewhere.
And for businesses already running on tight margins, increasing their general prices may be the most practical option.
Consider what that means.
A customer paying cash may now contribute towards the cost of accepting premium credit cards.
A pensioner using a basic debit card may contribute towards the costs associated with a payment system that also supports frequent flyer points, cash back rewards & other benefits enjoyed by higher-spending credit card customers.
In effect, consumers using cheaper payment methods may end up subsidising those using more expensive ones.
Of course, not every merchant will increase prices. And reductions in interchange fees may also lead banks to reassess the generosity of their credit card rewards programs.
But the potential for cross-subsidisation is very real.
We’ve removed the visible surcharge without necessarily removing the underlying cost.
And in doing so, we’ve potentially removed something else.
Transparency.
At least when a surcharge appeared separately on the bill, customers could identify what they were being charged for their chosen method of payment.
Once those costs are incorporated into general prices, that distinction disappears.
Now I’ve seen many people arguing that the solution is simply to prohibit banks & card issuers from charging merchant fees altogether.
But have they considered the consequences?
Banks aren’t charities. Nor are card networks & payment processors.
If regulators forced them to absorb the entire cost of providing electronic payment services without any means of recovering those costs, they would inevitably reassess the commercial viability of their products.
That could mean higher annual card fees, reduced rewards, tighter eligibility criteria, lower credit limits or fewer credit products available to consumers. Albeit fewer credit products might not be a good thing.
It could also place pressure on investment in payment infrastructure, fraud prevention & security.
And let’s not forget that electronic payment systems require substantial ongoing investment to remain secure, reliable & capable of processing millions of transactions.
With increasingly sophisticated cybercrime & financial fraud, that security is more important than ever.
You cannot legislate away the cost of providing a service. You can only change who pays for it, how they pay for it, or whether the service remains commercially viable.
The RBA argues that its reforms will reduce payment costs, improve competition & make pricing simpler.
It estimates the changes will save businesses approximately $910 million annually.
But estimated savings across the entire payment system tell us little about how those savings will be distributed, particularly among smaller businesses that previously recovered their processing costs through surcharges.
And whether the reforms achieve their stated objectives for consumers & businesses is another question entirely.
I’ll acknowledge that there was a legitimate problem with some businesses applying excessive surcharges or charging the same surcharge regardless of whether a customer used a low-cost debit card or a more expensive credit card.
But Australia already had rules requiring surcharges to reflect the reasonable cost of accepting the payment.
So why wasn’t the answer better enforcement of those rules rather than prohibiting surcharges altogether?
Because simpler pricing isn’t necessarily cheaper pricing.
And I’d argue it isn’t necessarily simpler either, if consumers can no longer distinguish between the cost of a product & the cost of their chosen method of paying for it.
A cost that becomes less visible doesn’t cease to exist.
And now we have the ATO debacle.
The ATO proposed stopping credit card payments rather than absorbing processing costs estimated at approximately $200 million annually.
But following considerable backlash from small businesses, Treasurer Jim Chalmers has intervened, providing funding to allow the ATO to continue accepting credit card payments until the end of June 2027 while further consultation takes place.
Think about the absurdity of that.
When the costs become a problem for a federal agency, the govt finds a way to provide temporary relief & further consultation. And guess what the other way is = all tax payers are funding it.
Yet thousands of small businesses must deal with the consequences of the same surcharge reforms.
If the ATO considers those costs too significant to absorb, why should we assume small businesses can do so without consequences?
And if taxpayers ultimately fund the ATO’s card processing costs, why should those who don’t use credit cards to pay their tax liabilities subsidise those who do?
The question isn’t whether consumers should be protected from excessive or unjustified surcharges.
They absolutely should.
The question is whether prohibiting legitimate cost recovery was the most sensible way to achieve that objective.
Because when regulators interfere with the way businesses recover their costs, those costs don’t simply vanish.
They move.
Sometimes into higher prices. Sometimes into reduced services. Sometimes into fewer payment options.
And sometimes onto the shoulders of consumers who weren’t responsible for incurring them in the first place.
That’s the problem with economic Whack-A-Mole.
You might succeed in knocking down the surcharge.
But you haven’t necessarily reduced the cost of doing business.
You’ve just made it harder to see who’s paying for it.